Tarrant County insurance attorneys will find the following case useful on many claims they encounter. The case is a 1984 Texas Supreme Court case styled, Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. Here is some of the relevant information.

In March 1980 Luna sought to purchase a 1980 Dodge Omni from North Star. A 30-day/1,000 mile “money back guarantee” was offered to new car purchasers. If a purchaser was not satisfied with the car, then the purchase price would be refunded if the car was returned prior to the expiration of 30 days from the purchase date or before the 1000-mile limitation occurred. Luna took delivery of the car and while driving it home noticed a constant vibration and rattling with the steering wheel.

Two days later Luna took the car back to North Star and asked salesman Lewis to refund her purchase money. North Star never told Luna they would not refund the purchase money, nor did North Star ever say they would. Luna claimed North Star told her the refund decision was up to someone who was not available at that time. North Star offered to fix the car. Luna claimed it was never fixed. Luna returned to North Star several times with the car. Luna testified she requested the purchase money back each time she brought the car back. Luna felt she had no choice but to let North Star attempt to repair the car because she was unable to obtain the purchase money refund she requested. Luna thought that if North Star did not fix the car, then she would still get her purchase money back.

Dallas County insurance lawyers will run into situations where a claim for “loss of use” as it relates to a vehicle will need to be made. An opinion that is a good case to look for guidance is from the Austin Court of Appeals in 1997, and is styled, “Mondragon v. Austin.” Here is some of the relevant information.

The facts of this case are undisputed. In mid-1993, Austin borrowed money and purchased a car for his daughter to drive while she was away at college. About two months later, Mondragon, driving drunk and backwards down the road, collided with Austin’s car while Austin’s daughter was driving it. As a result of the accident, the car could not be driven. Austin had the car towed to his home.

Shortly after the accident, Austin filed a claim with Mondragon’s insurance company. The company chose to deny the claim despite the circumstances surrounding the accident. Because Austin had no money and no collision insurance, he had no way to repair the car and did not obtain an estimate of the damage until September 1994, over one year after the accident.

Dallas insurance attorneys need to be able to answer the above question. This was addressed in a 1990 opinion from the Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.]. The style of the case is, Nielson v. Allstate. Here is some relevant information.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Allstate Insurance Company. For the reasons discussed here this court affirmed the trial court decision.

In November of 1978 Johanna Timm purchased an automobile insurance policy from Allstate. Timm was the sole named insured, and the insurance policy, by its terms, could not be assigned without Allstate’s written consent. Upon the death of the insured, however, coverage would extend to the legal representative of the deceased until the end of the policy period. Timm died in March of 1979. Allstate received renewal premiums for the policy and automatically renewed the policy in November of 1979 and 1980, but Allstate was not apprised of Timm’s death. In July of 1981 Charlotte Doyle died in a two-car automobile accident while driving the insured vehicle. Doyle was operating the automobile with the permission of the executor of Timm’s estate. Michael Shou Nielson, driver of the second auto, was severely injured in the accident. Nielson filed suit and received a default judgment against the administrator of Doyle’s estate. The administrator assigned any claim he might have against Allstate to Nielson. Nielson subsequently initiated this suit against Allstate.

Insurance attorneys in Dallas need to be able to advise a client when a policy had been properly renewed. An opinion from the Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.] helps in this advice. It is a 2009 case styled, Hartland v. Progressive County Mutual. Here is some information to know.

Hartland, obtained auto insurance through Progressive County Mutual Insurance. Policy number 37156966-1 began on November 9, 2003, at 12:01 a.m. and ended on May 9, 2004, at 12:01 a.m. Progressive sent Hartland a renewal bill on April 14, and a renewal reminder on April 23, stating the renewal policy period would run from May 9 to November 9. Hartland claimed he mailed a check in the amount of the renewal premium on May 8; Progressive attached a lockbox report to its counterclaim for declaratory judgment showing the postmark date was May 11. Joan Hartland was in a single-car accident on May 9, 2004 at approximately 8:00 a.m., damaging a car covered under the initial policy.

Progressive presented evidence that it received the check on May 16, and on May 18, sent Hartland a revised renewal declarations page. Policy number 37156966-2 listed coverage dates from May 12, 2004, at 12:01 a.m. to November 12, 2004, at 12:00 a.m., excluding coverage for the date of the accident. Progressive denied the claim, stating the policy was not in effect at the time of the loss.

Insurance lawyers in Dallas need to be aware of the law as it relates to an insurance company accepting a late premium payment. The Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.] issued an opinion in 2009, that dealt with this issue. The style of the case is, Hartland v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company. Here is some of the relevant information.

Charles Hartland, filed suit against Progressive, after the denial of an auto-insurance claim for a single-car accident. The jury found Hartland did not mail the premium to renew the policy until after the policy had expired; therefore, he did not have insurance when the accident occurred. On appeal, Hartland contended the parties formed a contract under the terms of the original renewal policy when Progressive accepted his premium payment, and therefore, the policy covered the accident.

Progressive sent Hartland a renewal bill on April 14, and a renewal reminder on April 23, stating the renewal policy period would run from May 9 to November 9. Hartland claimed he mailed a check in the amount of the renewal premium on May 8; Progressive attached a lockbox report to its counterclaim for declaratory judgment showing the postmark date was May 11. Joan Hartland, the wife, was in a single-car accident on May 9, 2004 at about 8:00 a.m., damaging a car covered under the initial policy.

Aledo insurance lawyers will not often run across what happened in this case, but it something to know about. The case is styled, McCallas v. State Farm Mutual. The opinion was issued by the Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.] in 1986.

The issue presented is whether the trial court was correct in holding that Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits can be denied on a geographic basis. This appeals court agreed with the decision of the trial court.

On March 3, 1984, McCalla was involved in an automobile accident on the island of Jamaica. He was hospitalized and treated. He has incurred expenses in excess of $2,500. Before the accident, McCalla was issued an insurance policy which was in effect at the time of the accident. This policy contained PIP coverage which was mandated by the Legislature. State Farm denied benefits because the policy applied only to accidents and losses which occurred in the United States and its territories or possessions, Puerto Rico or Canada. Thus, State Farm argued, the policy was not in effect when McCalla was driving in Jamaica.

Fort Worth insurance attorneys will see situations where claims are denied due to policy cancellation. Here is a case that dealt with that situation. It is a Corpus Christi Court of Appeals opinion issued in 2001. The style of the case is, Jones v. Ray Insurance Agency. Here is some of the relevant information.

Jones purchased a new 1998 Pontiac automobile and purchased a State & County Mutual Fire Insurance Company (insurer) insurance policy from Ray and Harbor Insurance covering the automobile. Jones discussed with Ray that her sister lived with her, and was advised by him that would not be a problem, and as long as she paid the premiums on time she would have insurance. The policy excludes coverage for anyone residing with Ray age fourteen or over unless listed. Ray paid the November and December premium payments. The policy was effective from November 7, 1997 through May 7, 1998.

On December 28, 1977, Jone’s automobile was severely damaged when hit by another automobile driven by an uninsured drunk driver. Her vehicle was towed to Collision Clinic, Inc. The day after the accident, Jones was told by the insurer that she was in the computer and was fully covered by the insurance policy. Less than thirty minutes after she was told she was covered, Jones received a call from the insurer and was told she no longer was covered by the policy. At first appellant was told the policy was cancelled because she had not excluded her sister as a driver. Later she was told that the cancellation was because she had not provided a copy of her driver’s license. Ray alleged the notice of cancellation was sent by letter on November 25, 1997, to Jones at 9109 Fondren # 605, Houston, Texas 77074, but Jones denies receiving the letter and notice of cancellation. The letter allegedly advised Jones that her insurance policy would be cancelled on December 4, 1997. Ray has not returned Jones’s December 1997 premium payment or any part thereof.

Dallas insurance lawyers will get a lot of calls wherein someone is asking the above question. This most often arises in the context of a motor vehicle accident. The Tyler Court of Appeals addressed this issue in a 2007 opinion styled, Canal Insurance v. Hopkins Towing. Here is some of the relevant information.

Henry Sweeney was operating a tractor-trailer rig hauling a load of peas when he lost control of the rig, which traveled off the road and into a deep ditch. The tractor-trailer struck several small trees and, eventually, rolled over onto its left side. Sweeney was the lessee and operator of the tractor, which was owned by Mullinax. Mullinax also owned the trailer. Both the tractor and trailer were insured against physical damage under an insurance policy issued by Canal. Mullinax was the named insured.

Trooper Faulkner ordered that a wrecker service be called in to tow the tractor and trailer. After two other wrecker services had refused the job because they “didn’t have the capabilities to do it,” Hopkins was called in to do the job. Because of the layout of the wreck site and the position of the tractor and trailer, Hopkins determined that they would have to use special air bags to return the trailer to an upright position. Hopkins recruited a subcontractor out of Tyler, Texas to supply the necessary air bags and operating personnel. In addition, Hopkins supplied three of his tow trucks and seven or eight employees who worked through the night, and in the rain, in order to remove the tractor and trailer from the ditch.

Dallas insurance lawyers who go to trial very often will have run across the situation presented in this 2006, Corpus Christi Court of Appeals opinion. The style of the case is, Perez v. Kleinert. In this case State Farm was sued for uninsured / underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. The attorney for State Farm attempted to mislead the jury by stating he represented the supposedly at fault driver rather than State Farm. Here is some of the relevant information.

At the time of the accident giving rise to this lawsuit, Perez was a passenger in Garza’s automobile. The automobile was a rental car that had been lent to Garza by either Brian or Jeanne Spacek. Before lending the automobile to Garza, the Spaceks had purchased an insurance policy from State Farm. After the accident, Perez made a claim against State Farm for benefits under the Spacek policy. After State Farm allegedly refused to pay benefits, Perez named State Farm as a defendant in the lawsuit, asserting claims against State Farm for “underinsured or uninsured motorist benefits” under the Spacek policy and for violations of the Texas Insurance Code.

State Farm initially took the position that Garza was an insured person under the Spacek policy. Pursuant to that policy, State Farm provided Garza with legal representation by retaining on her behalf the services of Troy Gilreath. Attorney Gilreath appeared before the trial court as Garza’s attorney of record and filed Garza’s answer to the lawsuit. Garza denied liability and asserted a crossclaim against Kleinert. Notably, Garza also alleged, among other things, that Perez, her passenger, was negligent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident.

Irving insurance attorneys will have many clients who travel to Mexico. The question then concerns auto coverage when traveling in Mexico. The first thing to do is to get with their agent and to read the policy. In order to understand how courts look at this issue, reading a 1999, El Paso Court of Appeals case may be helpful. The case is styled, Ruiz v. Geico. Here is some of the relevant information.

This is a summary judgement case wherein judgement was granted in favor of Geico.

Hermilinda Quesada de Ruiz was driving her 1996 Nissan Maxima in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, when she was involved in an automobile accident. The accident occurred within ten miles of the United States/Mexico border. As a result of the accident, Mrs. Ruiz incurred medical expenses arising from her injuries. The Ruizes contacted GEICO to advise of the accident and inquire as to coverage. GEICO responded that in accordance with the Ruizes’ policy, there was no coverage for the accident because it occurred in Mexico. The Ruizes received a letter from GEICO denying any and all liability. The Ruizes filed suit claiming that GEICO committed fraud because it negligently failed to disclose any limits of their coverage as it pertained to location. GEICO filed its motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court.

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