Dallas Fort Worth Insurance Lawyer Blog

Auto Policy Definitions

February 2, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Parker County insurance lawyers need to be able to read and discuss policy terms from a legal standpoint with prospective clients. A 1978, Dallas Court of Appeals case styled Republic Insurance Company v. Bolton may help in this regard.

M. Dean Bolton sued Republic Insurance Company, his insurer, for medical expenses and lost wages under the Personal Injury Protection (PIP) endorsement to his family automobile insurance policy. The injuries which formed the basis of Bolton’s claim resulted from an accident which occurred while he was driving a modified Volkswagen, referred to as a “dune buggy,” in an off-road race in Oklahoma. The sole disputed issue at trial was whether the dune buggy was a “motor vehicle” under the terms of the policy. This issue was submitted to a jury, which found that the dune buggy was a motor vehicle within the meaning of the policy. The trial court rendered judgment upon the verdict, and Republic appealed. This Court affirmed.

Republic’s initial argument was that the issue of whether the dune buggy was a motor vehicle under the policy was a question of law which should not have been submitted for jury determination, and hence, that the jury’s finding should be disregarded and judgment rendered against Bolton’s claim. Alternatively, Republic urges that the jury’s finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Policy Exclusions – Automobile

February 1, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Mineral Wells lawyers need to be able to give advice regarding insurance policy exclusions. The 1966, Texas Supreme Court case styled, Williams v. Cimarron Insurance Co. is a good place to start. Here is some information about this case.

This is an action to recover medical, hospital and funeral expenses under the medical payments provision of an automobile insurance policy issued by Cimarron Insurance Co., Inc. The facts are stipulated and the controlling question is whether the stock car racer here involved is comprehended by the definition of ‘automobile’ contained in coverage C of the policy. The trial court held that it was not and rendered judgment that Williams, take nothing against the insurance company. The Court of Civil Appeals at Amarillo affirmed. This court ruled that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was correct.

Jimmy Ray Williams, his wife and their minor son, James Richard Williams, were spectators at a race track located on private property when one of the stock car racers careened through the fence and struck all the members of the Williams family. Mr. and Mrs. Williams sustained serious personal injuries and James Richard was killed. The racer which struck them was a stripped-down 1947 Ford sedan with a 1954 Mercury motor owned by Carl Osborn and Robert R. Riddle. The vehicle had been originally manufactured by the Ford Motor Company, but it had been modified by Robert R. Riddle about a year prior to the accident and converted into a stock car racer and after modification, the vehicle had no tail lights, headlights or window glass. A screen wire served as a species of windshield. In front the car had a safety bar and two angle irons coming to a point about two and one-half (2 1/2) feet in front of the radiator, but it had no fenders, bumpers or horn. It was equipped with heavy-duty tie rods and spindles and oversized tires. The speedmeter cable was not connected and it was either towed or carried on a trailer to and from the race track. The vehicle was not licensed by the State of Oklahoma or any other state for operation upon the public roads and highways.

Total Loss Of Vehicle

January 30, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Mineral Wells insurance attorneys need to be able to discuss with clients who have wrecked their car, how an insurance company decides whether or not a car is a total loss or should be repaired.

When and whether a vehicle involved in a collision is considered to be “totaled” for first-party insurance purposes is an issue of great angst and confusion for most consumers. We hear horror stories about older, functioning automobiles being “totaled” simply because the frame is bent or other seemingly minor and hidden damage occurs. Even insurance professionals can get turned around navigating the maze of rules and regulations regarding the act of “totaling” a vehicle under a policy. But it needn’t be all that complicated.

Typically, cars are considered to be “totaled” when the cost to repair the vehicle is higher than the actual cash value (ACV) of the vehicle. Practically speaking, however, it is not always practical to repair a vehicle, even if the cost of repair is less than its ACV. A vehicle worth $4,000 requiring $3,000 in repairs might be considered “totaled” by an insurer even though the cost of repair is less than its value before the accident. Insurance companies will typically consider such a vehicle to be a total loss, even though the repairs are only 75 percent of ACV.

Total Disability

January 28, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Aledo insurance attorneys need to know how the court interpret “total disability” in an insurance policy. The 1961, Texas Supreme Court case styled, Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Tate is a good case to read for understanding. Here is some of the relevant information.

This policy provided for certain benefits to be paid to Tate in the event he was disabled before reaching the age of 60 years. It was stipulated that Tate was under 60 years of age at the time he claimed he became totally and permanently disabled. Upon answer to special issues in favor of Tate by the trial jury, the trial court granted Tate’s motion for judgment on the verdict for the sum of $2,922, due under the terms of the policy, and $350.64 as 12% penalty provided by statute for failure of Prudential to pay upon demand by Tate.

This court held that the lower courts were in error in determining the amount due under the terms of the policy and reversed the judgments of both lower courts and remand the cause to the trial court.

Denials – Don’t Wait To File A Lawsuit

January 26, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Arlington insurance lawyers know it is a mistake when a lawsuit is not filed asap after a claim is denied. A 1998, Corpus Christi Court of Appeals case illustrates this well. The style of the case is, Pena v. State Farm Lloyds.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Here is some relevant information.

The Penas purchased their home in July 1989. The single-story house was built in 1939 with a pier-and-beam foundation system, and a basement. The home’s hardwood floor was installed in 1939 without sub-flooring or a vapor barrier. In 1987, the then-owner, Ward Thomas, Jr., added a bathroom to the master bedroom at the rear of the house. The bathroom sits on a concrete slab foundation. Thomas never experienced any problems with the foundation or plumbing. After purchasing the home, the Penas obtained homeowner’s insurance coverage from State Farm.

Property And Casualty Insurance Bills

January 25, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Burleson insurance attorneys and all insurance attorneys need to keep up with the law related to insurance. The Insurance Journal printed a story that should be read to keep up to date in the insurance field of law.

The article tell us the Texas Department of Insurance has posted information and brief summaries of selected bills enacted during the 83rd Legislative regular session that relate to property/casualty insurance.

The bills listed may require action by regulated individuals and entities. The department advised affected entities to refer to the actual bills for the complete content of the legislation.

Read The Policy

January 23, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Saginaw insurance attorneys and their clients need to read and understand the insurance policies they are presented with by the insurance company. The United States 5th Circuit issued an opinion in November 2013, that illustrates why. The style of the case is Willoughby v. Metropolitan Lloyds. Here is the relevant information.

This appeal involves the timeliness of a homeowner’s lawsuit against her insurer. The district court determined the lawsuit was untimely and granted summary judgment. This appeals court affirmed.

Willoughby contracted with Metropolitan Lloyds for a homeowner’s insurance policy. The policy included a shortened limitations period, stating that “[a]ction brought against [Metropolitan] must be started within two years and one day after the cause of action accrues.” In November 2007, Willoughby reported to Metropolitan that a fire had damaged her home in Blooming Grove, Texas. Metropolitan subsequently investigated Willoughby’s insurance claim and examined her under oath regarding the circumstances of the fire. During the course of this examination, Willoughby provided her mailing address and stated that her and her husband’s attorney was Paul Lewallen. Nine months later, in a letter dated September 25, 2008, Metropolitan denied Willoughby’s claim, explaining that it believed “the fire was set by or at the direction of one or more of the named insureds.” The letter further explained that Willoughby had not complied with her insurance policy’s reporting obligations, one of which required her to provide a signed “proof of loss” statement. Metropolitan sent this letter to the mailing address provided by Willoughby. Willoughby denies ever receiving it.

The Other Person’s Insurance And Bad Faith

January 21, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Texas insurance attorneys already know that bad faith claims in Texas only apply to 1st party claims, not 3rd party claims.

The 1994, Texas Supreme Court case styled, Allstate Insurance Company v. Watson, explains how Bad Faith claims apply to 1st party claims. Here is the relevant information from that case.

Kathleen Watson was injured in a car accident. The driver of the other car was M.D. Townley, an insured under an automobile liability policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Watson filed suit against Townley alleging that Townley was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and her injuries. In the same action, Watson also sued Allstate under art. 21.21, section 16, for alleged unfair claim settlement practices in failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt settlement of her claims where liability had become reasonably clear and in denying or unreasonably delaying payment of her claim. Watson alleged that Allstate’s conduct violated 28 Tex.Admin.Code § 21.3 and section 17.46 of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). In addition to her claim under art. 21.21, Watson alleged violations of the DTPA, breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and sought a declaratory judgment that Watson was an intended third party beneficiary of the Allstate liability policy.

Misrepresentations In Life Insurance Policy

January 19, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Weatherford lawyers who handle life insurance disputes need to know the law relating to when an insurance company can void a policy after it has learned of a misrepresentation. The particular statute can be found in Texas Insurance Code, Section 705.005.

A 1969 case from the San Antonio Court of Appeals helps to show how this statute works. The style of the case is, Prudential Insurance v. Torres.

The facts are substantially undisputed. Prior to January 5, 1967, Torres was an employee of Gonzaba Lumber Company, which was owned by Luis Gonzaba, brother of Mrs. Bertha Torres. For some time, Luis Gonzaba and some of his six employees had considered securing a group insurance policy to provide hospitalization and medical benefits.

What If You Make A Misrepresentation?

January 18, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

An experienced insurance law attorney will tell that insurance misrepresentations made by the insured do not always mean “no coverage.”

A 1956, Texas Supreme Court case is a good illustration of the above. The style of the case is, Womack v. Allstate. Here is the relevant information.

This is a summary judgment case. On January 4, 1952, Allstate issued a policy of public liability automobile insurance to Mrs. L. N. Coffee, the wife of William T. Coffee. Malcolm Womack and others, recovered judgment in the 99th District Court of Lubbock County against William T. Coffee for the damages which they sustained on July 20, 1952, when the automobiles in which they were riding collided with a vehicle operated by the latter. Womack instituted this suit to recover the amount of the judgment from Allstate, alleging that at the time of the accident William T. Coffee was driving, with the consent of the insured, the automobile covered by Allstate’s policy. The trial court entered summary judgment for Allstate, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. This court reversed the summary judgment.