Most insurance lawyers like to think they can discuss insurance issues with their clients. Keeping informed as to what is happening in the insurance world allows that to be done. The New York Times published an article in February 2016, that has to information that can be helpful. The title of the article is, Some Auto Insurance Premiums Penalize Home Renters, Study Finds.

What does owning a home have to do with car insurance? Quite a bit, when it comes to the rates consumers pay for auto coverage, a new analysis finds.

Consumers pay about 7 percent more on average for annual car insurance premiums if they rent their home rather than own it, even if they have stellar driving records, according to the Consumer Federation of America‘s analysis of premium quotes from the major auto insurance companies.

Colleyville insurance lawyers handling bad faith claims need to read this U. S. Southern District, McAllen Division, opinion. The case is styled, Mark Dizdar, at al, vs. State Farm Lloyds, et al.

The claim arises from hail and storm damage sustained to Dizdar’s property on March 29, 2012. Shortly after the storm, Dizdar reported the claim to State Farm. Thereafter, Wallis inspected the property on behalf of State Farm on June 23, 2012, estimating the loss to the property at $1,096.76. On the same day, State Farm issued a check for $199.16, after applying depreciation and deductible.

On July 19, State Farm received an estimate from Dizdar’s contractor alleging that the damages totaled at least $24,000. Shortly thereafter, Dizdar requested a re-inspection of the property. On August 18, 2012, a subsequent inspection by Wallis resulted in an additional payment of $49.79. State Farm then closed the claim file.

Insurance lawyers will often times find themselves in Federal court. When this happens it is necessary that the lawsuit pleadings be in proper form. An opinion from the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas is instructive. The style of the case is, Cathy Broxterman v. State Farm Lloyds.

This case arises out of a dispute between a policyholder and her insurer regarding the extent of damages and amount of loss suffered to her property. State Farm issued a homeowners’ policy to Plaintiff, effective December 1, 2003, through December 1, 2014. On or about April 3, 2014, the Property suffered damage due to storm-related conditions.

On or about April 26, 2014, prior to reporting her claim to State Farm, Plaintiff signed document for representation by her public adjuster, John Bellerose, and the Voss Law Firm, to whom Bellerose referred her. On May 1, 2014, Bellerose’s company, Aware Owner, issued an estimate for the storm damages totaling $15,015.09. On or about May 27, 2014, Jesse Corona of the Voss Law Firm reported Plaintiff’s insurance claim to State Farm.

Homeowner insurance policies can be difficult to interpret when it comes time to make a claim for benefits. This 5th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion provides some insight into how the courts review and interpret insurance policies. The case is styled Claudia Ayoub; Gerald C. Ayoub v. Chubb Lloyds Insurance Company of Texas.

The principal question presented in this dispute over a homeowner’s insurance policy is whether a section of the policy setting forth a “reconstruction cost less depreciation” standard for dwelling loss is a coverage provision, on which the insured has the burden of proof, or a limitation of liability provision, on which the insurer has the burden. The court also had to decide how insureds can prove market value under Texas law for personal items which may have no such thing. For the reasons discussed below, the court found that summary judgment in favor of the insurer was not warranted on either issue.

The Ayoubs’ own a home in El Paso. Prior to the loss in this case, it was worth in the neighborhood of $2 million. The home was insured under a “Texas Standard Homeowners Policy” issued by Chubb. Coverage A of the Policy insured the dwelling for up to $2,511,000. Coverage B insured personal property in the home for up to $1,506,600. At additional cost, the Ayoubs purchased replacement cost endorsements for both their dwelling and personal property.

Life Insurance lawyers in Fort Worth need to read this Fort Worth Court of Appeals opinion from 1969. The case is styled, Giles et al. v Wiggins et al. The court discusses the required evidence necessary to invoke the “slayer statute” which is today found in the Texas Insurance Code, Section 110.151.

This suit involves ascertainment of the rightful claimant to the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by National Life and Accident Insurance Company. The latter, as stakeholder, filed the suit and deposited $8,009.11 into the registry of the court for disposition by it to the claimants entitled thereto.

Vergia L. Giles, insured, was shot by his wife, Evelyn Jean Wiggins, nee Evelyn Jean Giles, and primary beneficiary of the policy, on September 4, 1966. He died as result thereof on September 14, 1966.

Arlington life insurance lawyers should read this 1918 case. It is still good law with good reasoning. It is from the Beaumont Court of Appeals and is styled, Murchison et al. v. Murchison et al. The case says:

It was alleged in the petition that G.R. Murchison was the father, and Dailey Murchison and Ross Murchison, Jr., were the brothers, and said Dora Faris the sister, of the said R.H. Murchison, who, it was alleged, died on the 14th of April, 1915; and it was further alleged that the said Margurite Murchison was the wife of said R.H. Murchison at the time of his death. It was further alleged that the said R.H. Murchison left no child or children surviving him. It was further alleged that the policy of insurance made the basis of the suit was issued by the Royal Indemnity Company and was in full force and effect at the time of the death of said R.H. Murchison. It was further shown by the petition of plaintiffs that said policy provided that upon the death of said R.H. Murchison, the proceeds thereof should be paid to the said Margurite Murchison as sole beneficiary. It was further alleged in the petition that the said R.H. Murchison met his death at the hands of his said wife, Margurite Murchison, who feloniously killed and murdered him with the intention and for the purpose of securing and obtaining the money which it was provided by the terms of said policy should be paid to her upon the death of said R.H. Murchison.

It was then alleged, substantially, that because of the fact that the said Margurite Murchison did feloniously kill and murder the said R.H. Murchison, she forfeited all right and interest that she otherwise might have had in and to the proceeds of said policy of insurance as the beneficiary named therein; and, further, it was substantially alleged that because of the fact that the said Margurite Murchison feloniously killed and murdered said R.H. Murchison, she was not only prevented from claiming and recovering from the Royal Indemnity Company the amount of money stipulated to be paid her as beneficiary in said policy, but also that she thereby forfeited any and all right and interest in and to the proceeds of said policy in the hands of said Royal Indemnity Company, and was not, in law, entitled to have said proceeds or any part thereof under the law of descent and distribution of this state, but that plaintiffs, as the father, brothers, and sister of said R.H. Murchison, by reason of such relationship to him, immediately upon the death of said R.H. Murchison became and were entitled to recover of said Royal Indemnity Company the proceeds of said policy still in its hands, as the heirs and next of kin of the said R.H. Murchison. The petition is quite lengthy, and for the purposes of this opinion it is entirely unnecessary to quote the same in full, and we think that the foregoing substantial statement of the material allegations will be sufficient for the disposition here.

Insurance attorneys, when looking at an insurance policy, want to know who is covered under the policy. You have the named insured and then you have those who are assumed to be covered under the policy. What about a situation where a business changes it’s legal status by incorporating or becoming a partnership rather than what it was when the policy originated? The answer may depend on the state you are in.
Justia US Law circulated a story dealing with this issue. It is from a U.S. Tenth Circuit opinion in a opinion styled, Christy v. Travelers Indemnity.
Plaintiff-Appellant Corey Christy purchased a commercial general-liability insurance policy from Travelers in the name of his sole proprietorship, K&D Oilfield Supply. Subsequently, Christy registered his business as a corporation under the name K&D Oilfield Supply, Inc. Christy renewed his CGL Policy annually, but did not notify Travelers that he had incorporated his business. After Christy formed K&D, Inc., he was in an accident and made a claim under the CGL Policy. Travelers denied coverage based on Christy’s failure to inform it of the change in business form, and Christy filed this action. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court found in favor of Travelers. Because there was a material factual dispute as to whether Christy knew or should have known Travelers would have considered the formation of K&D, Inc. material to its decision to renew the Policy, summary judgment based on Christy’s legal duty to speak was inappropriate. And because the existence of a legal duty governs whether Christy engaged in a material misrepresentation by not informing Travelers he had formed K&D, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in reforming the Policy on that basis at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. But because Christy had not met his burden to come forward with evidence in support of his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim.

Life insurance attorneys will someday see a situation where the beneficiary on a life insurance policy is also the person who killed the insured. Can they recover the life insurance benefits? The Texas Supreme Court addressed that situation in a 1949 case styled, Greer et al. v. Franklin Life Insurance Co.

This controversy relates to ordinary death benefits under an insurance policy issued by Franklin Life. The insured, James Greer, met his death from a knife welded by his wife Margaret, who is also the named beneficiary under the policy. The next of kin of James are asserting their rights under the policy, claiming that Margaret forfeited her rights in willfully bringing about the death of James. Today, this is the “Slayer Statute” found in the Texas Insurance Code, Section 1103.151.

Texas courts have recognized the injustice of allowing the beneficiary to recover on a policy when they have murdered the insured.

Insurance attorneys in Texas need to know how the “misrepresentation defense” works. A good illustration in found in this January 2016, opinion from the Waco Court of Appeals. The case is styled, Karl Wallace v Amtrust Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc.

Until the time of his death in 2007, Wallace’s father lived on property located at 1100 Lone Oak Drive in Oakhurst, Texas–a few hundred miles from Fort Worth, Texas. This property included both a mobile home and 130 acres of land. Because he had been granted a life estate in the property, Robert Guenther began living in the mobile home until he died in 2009. Wallace, a resident of Fort Worth, subsequently took sole ownership of the property in late 2009.

Realizing that the property was left vacant and that the mobile home was deteriorating, Wallace decided to sell the property. However, to protect his interest in the interim, Wallace contacted John Cole Insurance Agency, Inc. to procure insurance. Wallace transacted with Cole because Cole’s company had insured the property for Wallace’s father.

Insurance lawyers can tell you that the process of a lawsuit on a claim can be complicated and confusing. But, understanding how the courts look at the process will help. A recent case from the Houston Court of Appeals [1st. Dist.] is a good read. It is styled, In Re Interinsurance Exchange Of The Automobile Club.

This is a mandamus action resulting from a trial court ordering Auto Club to turn over all reports of its retained engineer, Derrick S. Hancock, between the years 2000 and 2012, which relate to insurance claims.

The homeowners, John and Melanie Amponsah, had a homeowner’s policy with Auto Club. In 2012, they made a claim for foundation problems. Auto Club denied the claim base on the findings of Hancock saying the foundation problems were the result of settling and not a water leak. A lawsuit resulted claiming violations of the Texas Insurance Code and breach of contract.

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