Articles Posted in Home Owners Policies

The law clearly in Texas clearly places the burden on segregating damages on the insured.  This issue is discussed in a 2022 opinion issued by the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division.  The styled of the opinion is Benham Bagheri v. State Farm Lloyds.

This is a first-party insurance coverage action by Bagheri alleging a claim for breach of a homeowners insurance policy and extra-contractual claims in connection with damage to his residence caused by a large falling tree.  State Farm moves for summary judgment, contending that Bagheri’s breach of contract claim must be dismissed because he has not provided the jury a reasonable basis to segregate damage attributable solely to the covered event, as Texas law
requires, and that he has failed to produce evidence of actions by State Farm that, absent a
breach of contract, are sufficiently extreme to enable a reasonable jury to find in his favor on his extra-contractual claims.  For the reasons explained, the court grants State Farm’s
motion and dismisses this action with prejudice.

Bagheri, a homeowner and State Farm policyholder, filed a claim in 2020 after his residence was damaged by a large falling tree. State Farm inspected the residence and issued a payment that Bagheri deemed insufficient.  Bagheri retained a public adjuster to prepare another estimate and requested that State Farm perform a second inspection.  During the second inspection, State Farm determined that some of Bagheri’s claimed damage originated from a 2015 incident in which limbs from the same tree fell and damaged the same part of the house that Bagheri claimed was damaged in 2020.  In 2015 Bagheri was insured by Farmers and filed an insurance claim, which Farmers paid, for the damage caused to his residence by the fallen tree limbs.

This is a 2022, homeowners claim from the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.  The opinion is styled, Meridian Security Insurance Company v. Curtis Murphy.

In this case, Meridian seeks a declaratory judgment that it is not liable for damage caused by by a fire at Murphy’s home.  Murphy asserted counter claims.  Meridian now moves for summary judgment.

Murphy’s counter claims were dismissed by the Court.

This is a 2022, homeowners claim from the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.  The opinion is styled, Meridian Security Insurance Company v. Curtis Murphy.

In this case, Meridian seeks a declaratory judgment that it is not liable for damage caused by by a fire at Murphy’s home.  Murphy asserted counter claims.  Meridian now moves for summary judgment.

Murphy’s counter claims were dismissed by the Court.

This is a 2022, homeowners claim from the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.  The opinion is styled, Meridian Security Insurance Company v. Curtis Murphy.

In this case, Meridian seeks a declaratory judgment that it is not liable for damage caused by by a fire at Murphy’s home.  Murphy asserted counter claims.  Meridian now moves for summary judgment.

Murphy’s counter claims were dismissed by the Court.

Insurance claims often do not need an expert to help the case.  When an expert is needed, it is important to know how courts look at experts.  Here is a homeowners case wherein an expert is being used to bolster the case.  This is a 2022 opinion from the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division.  The opinion is styled, FB & SB Leasing, LLC v. Chubb Lloyds Insurance Company of Texas.

In this firstparty insurance dispute involving a property experiencing plumbing problems and foundation issues, Chubb presents two reliability arguments to support excluding the opinion
testimony of Plaintiff FB &SB Leasing’s sole causation expert, Michael B. Couch Chubb urges first that Couch’s report provides insufficient information about his methodology.  Second, Chubb argues Couch relied on mistaken or incorrect underlying data when opining that there were multiple leaks at the property.  There’s no dispute that Couch’s testimony, if reliable, would be relevant. Chubb also doesn’t dispute Couch’s qualifications. As argued, and on this record, Chubb’s complaints go to the eventual weight a jury might afford the testimony and are most appropriately addressed at trial via cross-examination or through introduction of competing expert testimony.


As to the first argument, there’s no dispute that Couch inspected the property on multiple occasions and relied on a plumbing report that noted multiple breaks in plumbing lines.  Relying on this underlying data and his ample training and experience, Couch opined on the cause of the damage to the property.  This is sufficient given the parties arguments presented here.  The second of Chubb’s arguments relies on a distinction Chubb draws between leaks and breaksin plumbing, which on this record is an issue better reserved for cross examination at trial.  Both sides experts relied on the same plumbing report that noted multiple plumbing issues.  Even Defendant’s expert appears to use the terms break and leak interchangeably in his expert report. Moreover, Chubb didn’t depose Couch, which might have provided more detail and nuance on these issues to further inform a motion to exclude.  Accordingly, on this record and based on the arguments presented by Chubb, the Motion, is Denied Without Prejudice.  Chubb may re-urge its arguments later in the case, via a motion in limine or at trial.

Here, an insurance company refused to pay a claim based on their assertion that the insured customer failed to segregate damages.  The Judge agreed with the insurance company.  The opinion is from the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division.  It is styled, Svetlin Tchakarov and Popova Rossitza v. Allstate Indemnity Company.

The plaintiffs filed suit to recover damages from Allstate for wind and hair damage to the roof of their property.  Allstate moved for summary judgment based on Allstate’s assertion that Plaintiff’s have not provided evidence that would allow a jury to reasonably apportion the harm from the covered and non-covered causes of loss.

The relevant portion of the policy reads:

Here is a 2021, opinion from the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, wherein the insurance company missed a deadline and tried to excuse the mistake.  The styled of the opinion is, Aldo Cueller v. Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana.

Aldo sued Safeco in state court for breach of contract and various violations of the Texas Insurance Code after Safeco denied Also’s claim for water damage to is property.  After the deadline for removal passed, Safeco filed a Notice of Removal and Aldo responded with a Motion to Remand arguing the removal was untimely.

Aldo filed the suit on May 25, 2021, and served Safeco’s registered agent in Texas on June 4, 2021.

The Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, decided a case in 2021 wherein the lawyer for insured did a good job of pleading his case.  The strange thing about this case is that it was filed in 2021, well after the new section of the Insurance Code was in effect, that being section 542A.  In section 542A, suing the adjuster has essentially been made something of the past, with rare exceptions.  However, it is not the issue in this case but the case still serves as a good example on how to name the insurance adjuster in such a way as to keep the case in State Court rather than being removed to Federal Court.

The style of the case is, Paradise Villas HOA, Inc. v. Amguard Insurance Company and Todd Anthony Gilmore.  Paradise is the insured, Amguard is the insurer, and Gilmore is the adjuster.

Paradise suffered alleged hail damage and properly reported the claim to Amguard.  Gilmore, a Texas Citizen, was assigned to adjust the claim and according to Paradise, Gilmore greatly under estimated the value of the claim.  A lawsuit was filed in State Court and Amguard caused the case to be removed to Federal Court alleging that Gilmore was improperly named in an effort to defeat diversity jurisdiction and asserting that the causes of action asserted against Gilmore could not stand.  Paradise filed a motion to remand which is the cause of this opinion.

Here is an interesting case dealing with hail damage.  This is a 2021, case from the San Antonio Court of Appeals.  It is styled, Allstate Vehicle And Property Insurance Company v. Peter Reininger.  The opinion is an appeal from a jury trial in favor of Reininger.

The opinion is lengthy and discusses several legal issues.  However, the facts of the case are pointed out here because the facts are similar to situations many other homeowners face themselves.

Reininger’s home had previously been covered by a policy issued by Liberty Mutual and that policy covered cosmetic hail damage to his metal roof.  When Reininger began looking for a new policy in 2015, he contacted Justin Losoya, an Allstate agent.  Reininger told Losoya he wanted a policy that was “apples to apples” with his Liberty Mutual policy, and Losoya stated Allstate could provide that. Reininger also asked Losoya, “If I have any bad weather, hail or any type of hail and it damaged my roof, am I covered?”  Losoya answered, “Yes, sir, Mr. Reininger, you are.  You pay a 1 percent deductible.”  Losoya did not mention any exclusions on coverage for the roof, and Reininger did not make any further inquiries about exclusions.

Here is a case from the Eastern District of Texas wherein the insureds did not show that the damages they received were the result of a covered damage.  The case is styled, Tim Whatley and Sheila Whatley v. Great Lakes Insurance, SE and McClelland & Hine, Inc.

In this case, the Whatleys are suing based on their assertion that they suffered damage to their home as a result of Hurricane Harvey.  The case was in Federal Court and had been referred to a Magistrate Judge, who issued a report granting Summary Judgment in favor of Great Lakes and McClelland.  The Whatley’s sought review of the finding made by the Magistrate Judge.

The Whatleys (Plaintiffs) presented four objections to the Report regarding their breach of contract claim.  First, Plaintiffs object “to the court’s finding and recommendation that there is no genuine issue of material fact to support the damage to ther oof and interior and interior of Plaintiffs’ home was caused by the windstorm conditions of Hurricane Harvey.”  Second, Plaintiffs “object to the court’s finding and recommendation that there are no genuine issues of fact to support the roof and interior home damage was caused by a covered peril.”  Third, Plaintiffs “object to the court’s finding and recommendation that there are no genuine issues of fact supporting causation; that the damage was caused by water through an opening created by the direct force of wind and hail.”  Finally, “Plaintiffs object to the court’s finding and recommendation that expert Lester Saucier’s opinions on causation are speculation.”

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