Articles Posted in Delay in Paying Claim

Texas insurance law lawyers need to be able to calculate how the Prompt Payment Act when calculating damages. A 2008, Fort Worth Court of Appeals case is good to read for guidance. The style of the case is, GuideOne Lloyds Insurance Company v. First Baptist Church of Bedford. Here is some of the relevant information.

First Baptist brought suit against GuideOne for hail damage to the roof of its church building. GuideOne’s engineer concluded the roof had to be replaced and could not be repaired. GuideOne solicited an estimate to repair the roof anyway, and the church obtained an estimate for the replacement cost, including a statutorily required insulation upgrade. GuideOne agreed to pay only its repair estimate and did not include any cost for the required insulation upgrade. The jury awarded the church approximately $286,000 for the covered losses, $60,000 in damages on the church’s bad faith claim, and $30,000 in compensatory and $55,000 in exemplary damages for a knowing violation, along with $100,000 in attorneys’ fees, and $188,000 based on the 18% interest penalty under the Prompt Pay Act for untimely payment of claims. The jury found that GuideOne had made an unconditional tender of $155,000 to the church after the church had filed suit. GuideOne argued that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury’s finding regarding its unconditional offer and that the interest penalty should not have been calculated without subtracting the $155,000 that the jury found it had unconditionally offered after the suit was filed. GuideOne also challenged certain questions on the jury charge as erroneous.

This appeals court held the trial court erred in disregarding the jury’s finding that GuideOne had unconditionally offered $155,000 to settle the claim because there was some evidence to support the jury’s finding. In applying the offer to arrive at a new interest calculation, the court applied the $155,000 tender first to the accrued prejudgment interest on the amount of the coverage with the balance applied the principle coverage amount owed, and then use the adjusted principle to calculate the 18% interest penalty for untimely payment. The court rejected GuideOne’s argument that First Baptist had not received a finding on the accrual date for its Prompt Pay claim because the accrual date was undisputed and need not be submitted to the jury.

Aledo insurance lawyers need to know how partial payment of an insurance claim works in a claim for violating the Prompt Payment of Claims Act. A 2004, Texas Supreme Court case styled, Republic Underwriters Insurance Company v. Mex-Tex, Inc. helps an insurance law attorney to understand. Here is the relevant information.

Facts: The roof atop a shopping mall was damaged by a hail storm. Before Republic agreed to pay for the replacement, Mex-Tex, owner of the mall, retained a roofer on a priority basis to replace the roof in order to avoid further injury to the tenants from future rains at a total cost of $179,000. Republic estimated the cost of replacing the roof with an identical make to be $145,460 and tendered that amount. The new roof was substantially similar in kind and quality to the old one, but the additional cost was due to the method of the roof’s attachment to the building and the high priority of the job. Republic refused to pay the balance of the claim and Tex-Mex sued. Tex- Mex sought to recover the balance of the amount owed plus a statutory 18% penalty on the entire claim. Republic argued that the penalty, if any, should be assessed only on the disputed amount, rather than on the entire claim. The trial court entered the judgment in favor of Tex-Mex and Republic appealed. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the policy did not require the replacement roof to be identical and that Republic’s tender of the amount it believed was owed on a claim did not stop the accrual of Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims Act penalties, or prejudgment interest, on what was later judicially determined to be the full amount of the claim. The Texas Supreme Court granted review.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, agreeing that replacement of a damaged roof with one of “like kind and quality” fell within the policy but rejecting the lower court’s holding that the Prompt Payment of Claims Act calls for an 18% penalty of the amount of the claim, not just the amount outstanding after partial tender.

Dallas insurance lawyers will tell you that when involved in a lawsuit, it is necessary to prove the case. In this regard, a recent opinion from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, needs to be read and understood. The style of the case is, Robert Bell and Cheryl Bell v. State Farm Lloyds. Here is the relevant information from the opinion.

Plaintiffs Robert and Cheryl Bell (“Plaintiffs”) purchased from Defendant an insurance policy covering property damage to Plaintiffs’ property. On June 22, 2012, after a hail and wind storm, Plaintiffs made a claim to Defendant for damage resulting from the storm. On June 27, 2012, Defendant acknowledged receipt of the claim and commenced an investigation. On July 24, 2012, State Farm adjuster Donald Kimberlin inspected Plaintiffs’ property with Mr. Bell and Plaintiffs’ contractor, Roland Vitullo. Kimberlin determined that Plaintiffs’ roof had been damaged and agreed that replacement was required. On August 21, 2012, Vitullo sent a copy of his estimate to Defendant. Defendant requested additional information.

On September 16, 2012, Defendant received an estimate from a public adjuster hired by Plaintiffs, Steve Whitehood of H&S Claim Recovery, that was lower than both Vitullo’s estimate and Defendant’s adjuster’s estimate. On September 21, 2012, Plaintiffs requested Defendant make a second inspection of their property. On October 6, 2012, Defendant sent another adjuster, Brandon White, who conducted an inspection with public adjuster Elvis Spoon. White estimated $32,907.45 in damages, which exceeded Kimberlin’s estimate. White’s estimate was sent to Plaintiffs. On December 13, 2012, after receiving a purported “final invoice,” for $32,879.33 from the construction firm that did the repair work, State Farm sent a payment for $32,907.45 less Plaintiffs’ deductible.

Fort Worth insurance attorneys need to be aware of this 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision. The style of the case is W.W. Rowland Trucking Company, Inc. v. Max America Insurance Co. Here is the relevant information from the case.

W.W. Rowland Trucking Company, Inc.’s Dallas, Texas truck terminal, in addition to an 18% penalty. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court was affirmed.

Rowland transported a load of video game consoles valued at $354,000 from Marshall, Texas, to its Dallas, Texas terminal. Thieves stole the tractor/trailer loaded with the consoles while it was located at the Dallas terminal. At the time of the theft, Rowland had an insurance policy Max America, also known as Alterra. The Policy’s section entitled “Coverage” provides for “Legal Liability Coverage,” which covers Rowland’s [L]egal liability for loss to covered property: a. while under [Rowland’s] care, custody, and control; [and] b. that [Rowland] become[s] legally obligated to pay as a common or contract carrier under a bill of lading, contract of carriage, or shipping receipt that is issued by [Rowland] or that is issued on [Rowland’s] behalf.

Texas insurance attorneys will be encouraged to read a recent report from Texas Watch. Texas Watch is a consumer advocate group that deals with insurance issues.

A February 14, 2013, press release tells us the following:

SPECIAL INTEREST PAC JUST CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH Access to the civil justice system is a fundamental right. It is embedded in our constitution because no one is above the law and everyone should be held to account for their actions.

Attorneys who handle insurance claims will generally know what is going on within the insurance industry. While most claims are handled properly and an insurance attorney never hears about those that are handled properly, it is the ones that are not handled properly that come to the attention of insurance attorneys.

The Insurance Journal published an article in early 2014, told of insurance complaints being filed in Texas. Here is the title of the article, “Insurer Group: Texas Auto, Homeowner Complaints at a record Low.” Here is what the article tells us.

“In 2013, Texas drivers and homeowners filed the fewest number of complaints against their insurance companies since the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) began keeping records, the Insurance Council of Texas reports.

Insurance lawyers will tell you that insurance companies can expose themselves to risk by not settling liability claims that they should settle. This relates to what is called the “Stowers Doctrine.” But exposing themselves to risk and and suffering the risk are two different things. The 1960, Amarillo Court of Appeals case, Chancey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, is an example where the insurance company did not get in any trouble. Here is some information about the case.

The present case followed Amsterdam’s refusal to compromise and settle the claim of one Walter Van Luit against Chancey which resulted in a jury verdict and judgment against Chancey in the amount of $58,422.83. The policy limits under the liability policy issued to Chancey was $50,000. The record reflects Amsterdam paid Van Luit the amount of the policy limit of $50,000 plus interest and court costs. Chancey has paid the balance of $8,422.83 to Van Luit, and it is this amount Chancey is seeking over and against Amsterdam. The case was submitted to a jury and upon the finding of the jury the trial court entered a judgment that Chancey take nothing. From this judgment Chancey duly perfected this appeal.

Chancey complained of the trial court’s action in sustaining an exception to Chancey’s petition which alleged the failure of Amsterdam to ‘negotiate’ for a settlement of the case, and refusal of the trial court to submit issues based on the above allegation. It is Chancey’s contention that in as much as the policy gives the insurance coompany the right to ‘investigate, negotiate and settle’ any claim arising under the policy, this right is equally accompanied by the duty to negotiate as well as to settle. The landmark case in Texas on this question is the case of Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., in which is found the following language:

Dallas insurance lawyers need to know this recent court decision regarding “loss of use” damages. It is a Fort Worth Court of Appeals decision issued in January 2014. The style of the case is, Morrison V. Campbell. Here is some of the relevant information.

In this agreed interlocutory appeal, Morrison appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on the claim for loss of use damages brought against him by Campbell. Morrison’s vehicle struck Campbell’s motorcycle in an accident, and the motorcycle was damaged. Morrison argued that loss of use damages are not available to Campbell because his motorcycle was declared a total loss. Because this court held that damages for loss of use are available in total loss cases when the insurer unreasonably delays payment of a claim, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment.

The accident that gave rise to this suit occurred on October 23, 2009. On June 22, 2010, Morrison’s insurance carrier (Insurer) sent a letter to Campbell’s attorney denying Campbell’s claim based on its determination that Campbell was at fault for the accident because of “faulty evasive action & following too closely.”

Arlington insurance lawyers know it is a mistake when a lawsuit is not filed asap after a claim is denied. A 1998, Corpus Christi Court of Appeals case illustrates this well. The style of the case is, Pena v. State Farm Lloyds.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Here is some relevant information.

The Penas purchased their home in July 1989. The single-story house was built in 1939 with a pier-and-beam foundation system, and a basement. The home’s hardwood floor was installed in 1939 without sub-flooring or a vapor barrier. In 1987, the then-owner, Ward Thomas, Jr., added a bathroom to the master bedroom at the rear of the house. The bathroom sits on a concrete slab foundation. Thomas never experienced any problems with the foundation or plumbing. After purchasing the home, the Penas obtained homeowner’s insurance coverage from State Farm.

Tarrant County insurance attorneys should be familiar with the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act. Here is a little information taken from a State Bar of Texas publication that attorneys and their clients should know. The article was discussing the legality of ordering an insurance company to pay restitution for it’s failure to promptly pay claims.

In 1999, the Texas State Legislature enacted House Bill 610, commonly known as the Prompt Pay Act. It’s general purpose was to require payors under the act, such as insurance companies including health insurance companies, to pay or deny the bills of medical providers within forty-five days after receipt of a bill, provided the claim was “clean,” as defined by the Act. If an insurance company violated this Act, they were subject to the various penalties provided for in the legislation itself. In addition, certain violations might subject an insurance company to administrative penalties under former article 1.10E of the Insurance Code, which is currently Texas Insurance Code, Section 843.342(k). However, these penalties are not the exclusive penalties for violating the Prompt Pay Act. The Act contains a “dragnet” provision clearly reading, “in addition to any other penalty or remedy authorized by this code or another insurance law of this state.”

The language in the dragnet provision indicates the Texas Insurance Commissioner can resort to the power of restitution for violations of the Prompt Pay Act, since restitution is an “other remedy” authorized by the Insurance Code in Section 82.053. Senate Bill 403 allowed the Insurance Commissioner to order restitution to “each entity operating in the state that is harmed by a violation of, or failure to comply with, this code or a rule of the commissioner. Since a medical provider would be an “entity operating in this state,” the Insurance Commissioner could order an HMO, for example, to pay “restitution” to any medical provider that was harmed by a violation of the Act.

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