Auto Insurance

Named Driver Policies

November 1, 2015 | Mark S. Humphreys

Arlington lawyers looking at insurance claims need to be aware of new laws governing the issuance of auto policies. The particular type of policy effected by these new laws are what are known as “Named Driver Automobile Insurance Policies” and knowing whether or not one of these policies is enforceable or not is necessary to properly advise a client about potential claims.

The new law is found in the Texas Insurance Code, Section 1952.0545 and says this:

REQUIRED DISCLOSURE REGARDING NAMED DRIVER POLICIES; PERSONS IN INSURED’S HOUSEHOLD.

What Is A “Motor Vehicle” In An Insurance Policy

April 23, 2015 | Mark S. Humphreys

Duncanville insurance lawyers will find that the definitions in insurance policies often have their own meaning. So, what is the definition of “motor vehicle” as it relates to an insurance policy? A 1977, Texas Supreme Court opinion helps. It is styled, Slaughter v. Abilene State School et al.

Slaughter, while an employee of the Abilene State School, was injured when another employee backed a tractor over Slaughter and pinned him between the tractor wheel, the ground and a building.

The trial Court entered judgment for Slaughter and the appeals court reversed.

Stowers Claims

January 24, 2015 | Mark S. Humphreys

Every Dallas and Fort Worth insurance lawyer has to have an understanding of “Stowers” claims.

Under Texas law, a demand for policy limits is generally referred to as a Stowers demand and can give rise to a suit against the insurance company to collect any excess judgment under the Stowers doctrine. Under the Stowers doctrine, an insurance company owes an implied duty of ordinary care to its insured/customer to accept a reasonable settlement demand that is within policy limits. This is from a case every law school student learns about in law school. The style of the case is G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co. It is a Texas Supreme Court case from1929, holding that an insurance company “is held to that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and diligence would exercise in the management of his own business.” Physicians Ins. Exchange v. Garcia, is a 1994, Texas Supreme Court case that further supported the Stowers ruling. The Stowers duty is not activated by a settlement demand unless three prerequisites are met: (1) the claim against the insured is within the scope of coverage, (2) the demand is within the policy limits, and (3) the terms of the demand are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured’s potential exposure to an excess judgment.

Another case, the case of Bramlett v. the Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana, which was written by one of the most respected and conservative Republican federal judges in Texas, the Hon. Sidney Fitzwater, contains key holdings which are particularly instructive as to insurance company’s duties in response to this demand and essentially negates any potential defenses that could be asserted in our future Stowers doctrine case. Bramlett also addresses the common Stowers defendant insurance company plea that they should not be liable because they did not have sufficient knowledge of the case at the time the demand was made. The Bramlett Court held: “There is no per se requirement that an insurer know all, or even most, of the facts of the case in order to have a Stowers duty. Indeed, early settlement is encouraged.” Here, there is ample evidence to support our negligence claim against a defendant such that te insurance company must either accept the demand or assume the risk that it will not be able to do so later. If a claimant makes such a settlement demand early in the negotiations, the insurance company must either accept the demand or assume the risk that it will not be able to do so later. In cases presenting a real potential for an excess judgment, insurance companies have a strong incentive to accept.

Insurance Coverage When Driving Company Vehicle

January 18, 2015 | Mark S. Humphreys

Dallas insurance attorneys can tell you that some insurance companies refuse to cover people who are involved in a wreck while driving a company vehicle. Yet the company says the drivers personal insurance should be the coverage. What to do???

Forbes published an article that talks about this issue. Here is what is learned from the article.

In the last year, car-service app startups Uber and Lyft have made major progress toward fixing their drivers’ insurance issues, gradually taking more responsibility for accidents that happen to on-duty drivers. But one sticky problem persists: drivers often lie to their personal insurance about their work, which can lead to confusion and, in some extreme cases, insurance fraud.

Who Is An User Of A Vehicle?

January 8, 2015 | Mark S. Humphreys

Fort Worth insurance lawyers can tell you about all kinds of situations they get questions about. A 1997, Dallas Court of Appeals case is a case not seen everyday. The style of the case is American Economy Insurance Co. v. USAA.

This is one insurance company suing another. In the underlying case, Scott Johnson was driving a vehicle belonging to his father. Three friends, including Benjamin Ellis, were passengers. Scott and the passengers were intoxicated. The vehicle collided with a second car and Scott was killed. The passengers injured.

The occupants of the second car brought suit against the father, alleging that the vehicle crossed over the center line while traveling at an excessive speed. The plaintiffs also alleged that the passengers had encouraged, aided, and abetted Scott’s negligent acts and reckless driving, and that the passengers’ occupancy of the vehicle constituted a “use” of the vehicle.

Negligent Entrustment And Permission To Drive

June 19, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Dallas attorneys handling auto insurance cases would want to know of this 1960 case. It is from the Texarkana Court of Appeals and is styled Hanson v. Green. Here is some of the relevant information.

This is an automobile collision suit wherein Jerry R. Hanson and wife were plaintiffs and Roy Green was defendant. The trial court instructed a verdict in favor of defendant Green and the Hansons have appealed.

The material undisputed facts are briefly in effect as follows: Appellee Roy Green was the owner of a 1955 Chevrolet automobile which was in good mechanical condition. On May 19, 1957, his daughter, Nancy, requested and received permission from her father to drive the automobile over to a friend’s house, the Brownings, for a social visit, and the father cautioned her to be careful. No one accompanied her. Nancy then lacked about two months being 15 years of age, she had no driverhs license, and had been driving ‘close to a year’ prior thereto. At no time prior to May 19, 1957, did appellee have any knowledge that Nancy would permit anyone else to drive the automobile, and if appellee had known on the occasion of May 19, 1957, that Nancy would have permitted any other person to drive the car he would not have let her the car. Nancy permitted one of her friends, Gerald Lee Hunt, a minor, who had no driver’s license, to drive the automobile, and Hunt was driving the automobile at the time of its collision with the vehicle operated by appellant Jerry R. Hanson. Mrs. Hanson was riding in the Hanson car and alleged receipt of personal injuries in the collision for which suit was brought, as well as for property damages to the Hanson automobile.

Occupying A Vehicle

April 5, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Insurance lawyers in Dallas need to be able to tell a new client whether or not they have a claim worth pursuing. In 1963, the Waco Court of Appeals issued an opinion that insurance lawyers should know about. The style of the case is, Ferguson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company. Here is the relevant information from that case.

Ferguson sued Aetna Casualty upon the ‘medical payments provision‘ of a policy issued upon her automobile. Such policy provided medical payments for the named insured who sustains ‘bodily injury, caused by accident, while occupying or through being struck by an automobile.’ The term ‘occupying’ is defined in the policy as meaning ‘in or upon or entering into or alighting from an automobile.’

Ferguson had been to the beauty parlor. She left the beauty parlor, came out onto the parking lot where she had left her automobile. In front of the beauty shop was a board that went out into the parking area. Parked alongside of this board at the end of it was ‘an automobile’. Ferguson walked to the end of the board and reached out and grabbed the door handle of the car to support herself. While holding onto the handle for support, she stepped off the board and went down into the mud, breaking both legs and suffering other injuries. The car Ferguson had hold of was not her own, and she was not in the act of entering such car; she was merely holding onto the handle for support as she walked around the car on her way to her own car, which was parked further down on the parking lot. However, if Ferguson was ‘in or upon, or entering or alighting from’ this particular car, she would be covered by the policies..

Vehicle Insurance Policies

March 20, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Insurance law lawyers need to be able to distinguish cases where they can help someone and cases where they cannot. Understanding how courts look at different situations is important. A 1992, Texas Supreme Court is a good case to know. The style of the case is, LeLeaux v. Hampshire-Fannett ISD. Here is some of the relevant information.

Monica LeLeaux, a sixteen-year-old high school junior, hit her head while trying to close the back door of a school bus. She and her mother sued the owner of the bus, the Hamshire-Fannett Independent School District, and the bus driver for damages. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants.

Monica’s accident occurred on a school band trip, the events of which are summarize here based solely upon Monica’s deposition testimony. She and the other band members had traveled in school buses to another school to compete in a marching contest. Once they finished, Monica and some of her schoolmates, along with the band director, stayed to watch other bands perform. At some point Monica returned to the bus she had ridden to the contest. The bus was parked and empty, and the rear emergency door was open. Monica did not open it, and she does not know who did. She and a friend, J.R. Thompson, sat together on pillows in the rear doorway of the bus, dangling their feet out the back, talking. No one else was in the bus while they were there.

Vehicle Use And Permission

February 20, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Dallas insurance attorneys understand how the “permissive driver” rule works in Texas. Here is a case that helps explain it. It is a 2003, Texas Supreme Court case styled, Sink v. Progressive. Here is some of the relevant information.

This case concerns coverage for a “temporary substitute” vehicle under the standard Texas Personal Auto Policy. The issue is whether the policy provides liability coverage when the insured, whose own vehicle is disabled, takes and drives an automobile owned by someone who is not a family member without permission or the reasonable belief that he has permission and is involved in an auto accident with a third party. The trial court correctly held that there is no liability coverage under these circumstances.

Joshua McCauley’s pickup truck became disabled. He was at that time employed by Alamo Rent-A-Car, and while on the job, he took one of its rental cars to drive to a location that is not disclosed in the record to get his tools so that he could attempt to repair his truck. It is uncontested that McCauley did not obtain permission from Alamo to use any of its vehicles and did not believe that he had permission to use the car in question. While returning to work in Alamo’s car, McCauley was involved in an accident with Paul Sink.

Insurance Policy Language

February 11, 2014 | Mark S. Humphreys

Arlington insurance attorneys know how important the language in a policy is and how that language relates to the facts in a claim. The Houston Court of Appeals issued an opinion in 1996, in the case styled, “Schulz v. State Farm Mutual Auto.” Here is some the relevant information in this summary judgment case.

The summary judgment evidence shows that Gunar Fulk, Schulz’s son, was driving a pickup truck owned by Schulz’s husband and insured by State Farm. Fulk, accompanied by a friend, gave a ride to Lonnie Earl Johnson. Some time thereafter, Johnson shot three fatal rounds into Fulk’s face and chest as Fulk was standing outside the truck. Johnson then killed Fulk’s friend with a shot to his back.

Schulz sued State Farm seeking to recover benefits under the personal injury protection (PIP) and auto death indemnity (ADI) coverages provided under a State Farm insurance policy that covered the vehicle. In her original petition, Schulz claimed Johnson pulled the gun in an apparent attempt to hijack the truck. She also claimed that, at the time the shots were fired, Fulk was either seated in the truck or, in the alternative, had been ordered at gunpoint to get out and was kneeling next to the truck. However, there is nothing in the record, other than Schulz’s assertions in her original petition, to support the allegations that Fulk’s truck was hijacked, that Fulk was ordered out of the truck or that Fulk was kneeling next to the truck when shot.